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“J
ournals have devolved into 
information laundering 
operations for the 
 pharmaceutical  industry”, 
wrote Richard Horton, editor of the 
Lancet, in March 2004 [1]. In the same 
year, Marcia Angell, former editor of 
the New England Journal of Medicine, 
lambasted the industry for becoming 
“primarily a marketing machine” and 
co-opting “every institution that might 
stand in its way” [2]. Medical journals 
were conspicuously absent from her 
list of co-opted institutions, but she 
and Horton are not the only editors 
who have become increasingly queasy 
about the power and inﬂ  uence of the 
industry. Jerry Kassirer, another former 
editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine, argues that the industry has 
deﬂ  ected the moral compasses of 
many physicians [3], and the editors 
of PLoS Medicine have declared that 
they will not become “part of the cycle 
of dependency…between journals 
and the pharmaceutical industry” [4]. 
Something is clearly up.
The Problem: Less to Do 
with Advertising, More to Do 
with Sponsored Trials
The most conspicuous example of 
medical journals’ dependence on 
the pharmaceutical industry is the 
substantial income from advertising, 
but this is, I suggest, the least 
corrupting form of dependence. The 
advertisements may often be misleading 
[5,6] and the proﬁ  ts worth millions, 
but the advertisements are there for all 
to see and criticise. Doctors may not be 
as uninﬂ  uenced by the advertisements 
as they would like to believe, but in 
every sphere, the public is used to 
discounting the claims of advertisers.
The much bigger problem lies with 
the original studies, particularly the 
clinical trials, published by journals. 
Far from discounting these, readers see 
randomised controlled trials as one of 
the highest forms of evidence. A large 
trial published in a major journal has 
the journal’s stamp of approval (unlike 
the advertising), will be distributed 
around the world, and may well receive 
global media coverage, particularly 
if promoted simultaneously by press 
releases from both the journal and 
the expensive public-relations ﬁ  rm 
hired by the pharmaceutical company 
that sponsored the trial. For a drug 
company, a favourable trial is worth 
thousands of pages of advertising, 
which is why a company will sometimes 
spend upwards of a million dollars 
on reprints of the trial for worldwide 
distribution. The doctors receiving the 
reprints may not read them, but they 
will be impressed by the name of the 
journal from which they come. The 
quality of the journal will bless the 
quality of the drug.
Fortunately from the point of 
view of the companies funding these 
trials—but unfortunately for the 
credibility of the journals who publish 
them—these trials rarely produce 
results that are unfavourable to the 
companies’ products [7,8]. Paula 
Rochon and others examined in 1994 
all the trials funded by manufacturers 
of nonsteroidal anti-inﬂ  ammatory 
drugs for arthritis that they could ﬁ  nd 
[7]. They found 56 trials, and not one 
of the published trials presented results 
that were unfavourable to the company 
that sponsored the trial. Every trial 
showed the company’s drug to be as 
good as or better than the comparison 
treatment.
By 2003 it was possible to do 
a systematic review of 30 studies 
comparing the outcomes of studies 
funded by the pharmaceutical industry 
with those of studies funded from 
other sources [8]. Some 16 of the 
studies looked at clinical trials or 
meta-analyses, and 13 had outcomes 
favourable to the sponsoring 
companies. Overall, studies funded by a 
company were four times more likely to 
have results favourable to the company 
than studies funded from other 
sources. In the case of the ﬁ  ve studies 
that looked at economic evaluations, 
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the results were favourable to the 
sponsoring company in every case.
The evidence is strong that 
companies are getting the results they 
want, and this is especially worrisome 
because between two-thirds and three-
quarters of the trials published in the 
major journals—Annals of Internal 
Medicine, JAMA, Lancet, and New 
England Journal of Medicine—are funded 
by the industry [9]. For the BMJ, 
it’s only one-third—partly, perhaps, 
because the journal has less inﬂ  uence 
than the others in North America, 
which is responsible for half of all the 
revenue of drug companies, and partly 
because the journal publishes more 
cluster-randomised trials (which are 
usually not drug trials) [9].
Why Do Pharmaceutical 
Companies Get the Results 
They Want?
Why are pharmaceutical companies 
getting the results they want? Why are 
the peer-review systems of journals not 
noticing what seem to be biased results? 
The systematic review of 2003 looked 
at the technical quality of the studies 
funded by the industry and found that 
it was as good—and often better—than 
that of studies funded by others [8]. 
This is not surprising as the companies 
have huge resources and are very 
familiar with conducting trials to the 
highest standards.
The companies seem to get the 
results they want not by ﬁ  ddling 
the results, which would be far too 
crude and possibly detectable by peer 
review, but rather by asking the “right” 
questions—and there are many ways to 
do this [10]. Some of the methods for 
achieving favourable results are listed 
in the Sidebar, but there are many 
ways to hugely increase the chance of 
producing favourable results, and there 
are many hired guns who will think up 
new ways and stay one jump ahead of 
peer reviewers.
Then, various publishing strategies 
are available to ensure maximum 
exposure of positive results. Companies 
have resorted to trying to suppress 
negative studies [11,12], but this is a 
crude strategy—and one that should 
rarely be necessary if the company is 
asking the “right” questions. A much 
better strategy is to publish positive 
results more than once,  often in 
supplements to journals, which are 
highly proﬁ  table to the publishers and 
shown to be of dubious quality [13,14]. 
Companies will usually conduct 
multicentre trials, and there is huge 
scope for publishing different results 
from different centres at different times 
in different journals. It’s also possible 
to combine the results from different 
centres in multiple combinations.
These strategies have been exposed 
in the cases of risperidone [15] and 
odansetron [16], but it’s a huge 
amount of work to discover how many 
trials are truly independent and how 
many are simply the same results 
being published more than once. And 
usually it’s impossible to tell from the 
published studies: it’s necessary to go 
back to the authors and get data on 
individual patients.
Peer Review Doesn’t Solve 
the Problem
Journal editors are becoming 
increasingly aware of how they are 
being manipulated and are ﬁ  ghting 
back [17,18], but I must confess that it 
took me almost a quarter of a century 
editing for the BMJ to wake up to 
what was happening. Editors work by 
considering the studies submitted to 
them. They ask the authors to send 
them any related studies, but editors 
have no other mechanism to know 
what other unpublished studies exist. 
It’s hard even to know about related 
studies that are published, and it may 
be impossible to tell that studies are 
describing results from some of the 
same patients. Editors may thus be 
peer reviewing one piece of a gigantic 
and clever marketing jigsaw—and the 
piece they have is likely to be of high 
technical quality. It will probably pass 
peer review, a process that research 
has anyway shown to be an ineffective 
lottery prone to bias and abuse [19].
Furthermore, the editors are likely 
to favour randomised trials. Many 
journals publish few such trials and 
would like to publish more: they 
are, as I’ve said, a superior form of 
evidence. The trials are also likely to be 
clinically interesting. Other reasons for 
publishing are less worthy. Publishers 
know that pharmaceutical companies 
will often purchase thousands of 
dollars’ worth of reprints, and the 
proﬁ  t margin on reprints is likely to be 
70%. Editors, too, know that publishing 
such studies is highly proﬁ  table, and 
editors are increasingly responsible 
for the budgets of their journals and 
for producing a proﬁ  t for the owners. 
Many owners—including academic 
societies—depend on proﬁ  ts from their 
journals. An editor may thus face a 
frighteningly stark conﬂ  ict of interest: 
publish a trial that will bring US$100 
000 of proﬁ  t or meet the end-of-year 
budget by ﬁ  ring an editor.
Journals Should Critique Trials, 
Not Publish Them
How might we prevent journals from 
being an extension of the marketing 
arm of pharmaceutical companies 
in publishing trials that favour their 
products? Editors can review protocols, 
insist on trials being registered, 
demand that the role of sponsors 
be made transparent, and decline 
to publish trials unless researchers 
control the decision to publish [17,18]. 
I doubt, however, that these steps will 
make much difference. Something 
more fundamental is needed. 
Firstly, we need more public funding 
of trials, particularly of large head-
to-head trials of all the treatments 
available for treating a condition. 
Secondly, journals should perhaps 
stop publishing trials. Instead, the 
protocols and results should be made 
available on regulated Web sites. 
Only such a radical step, I think,  will 
stop journals from being beholden to 
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Examples of Methods for 
Pharmaceutical Companies to 
Get the Results They Want from 
Clinical Trials
• Conduct a trial of your drug against a 
treatment known to be inferior.
• Trial your drugs against too low a dose 
of a competitor drug.
• Conduct a trial of your drug against too 
high a dose of a competitor drug (making 
your drug seem less toxic).
• Conduct trials that are too small to show 
differences from competitor drugs.
• Use multiple endpoints in the trial and 
select for publication those that give 
favourable results.
• Do multicentre trials and select for 
publication results from centres that are 
favourable. 
• Conduct subgroup analyses and select 
for publication those that are favourable.
• Present results that are most likely 
to impress—for example, reduction in 
relative rather than absolute risk.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0366
companies. Instead of publishing trials, 
journals could concentrate on critically 
describing them.  
This article is based on a talk that Richard Smith 
gave at the Medical Society of London in October 
2004 when receiving the HealthWatch Award for 
2004. The speech is reported in the January 2005 
HealthWatch newsletter [20]. The article overlaps 
to a small extent with an article published in the 
BMJ [21].
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